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This paper considers how workers’ compensation rules affect the impact of employment 
protection statutes on the labor market outcomes of the disabled.  Employment protection for 
the disabled requires employers to make “reasonable” accommodations and bars them from 
discriminating in hiring and firing.  We argue that these accommodations required by 
employment protection provisions can reduce workers’ compensation costs to employers by 
reducing the time out of work associated with workplace injuries.  This reduction in workers’ 
compensation costs that comes from complying with employment protection statutes should 
make these policies more beneficial for workers who become injured on the job compared to 
those who are disabled for other reasons.  We test this prediction by examining the 
employment outcomes of workers’ compensation recipients and other disabled workers after 
changes to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).  Our findings suggest 
that, as we predict, changes to FEHA requiring greater accommodations increased the 
employment of workers’ compensation recipients relative to other disabled workers. 
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A. Introduction 
 
 Employment  protection  statutes are designed to shield individuals in protected classes 
from discrimination in the workforce by providing them with legal redress when they face 
prohibited employer practices.  The disabled constitute one such class, and employment 
protection for disabled workers entitles them to “reasonable” accommodations that allow 
them to perform necessary job functions and bars discrimination in hiring, termination or 
compensation.  Presumably, a key goal of offering this protection to the disabled is to improve 
their earnings and employment opportunities.  However, past studies have demonstrated that 
employment protection, specifically the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), has had a 
negligible or even harmful effect on the labor market outcomes of the disabled (Oi, 1991; 
Rosen, 1991; DeLaire, 2000a, 200b; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Hotchkiss, 2003, 2005; 
Jolls and Prescott, 2004).  In this paper we study how the impact of employment protection 
differs for a specific subset of the disabled population, those who become disabled as a result 
of a workplace injury. 
One factor that separates the disabled as a class from other protected groups, such as 
racial or ethnic minorities, is that a nondisabled individual can become disabled after 
experiencing an adverse health shock.
1  In particular, a nontrivial fraction of disabilities occur 
as a result of someone experiencing a workplace injury or illness.
2  This is noteworthy 
because an extensive regulatory and compensation system already governs workplace injuries 
and illnesses, and there are a myriad of ways in which these policies might interact with 
                                                 
1 In principle, demographic changes in the ethnic composition of the population can make someone a minority.  
However, such changes generally occur over relatively long periods of time and far less frequently than people 
experience health shocks that leave them disabled. 
2 Reville and Schoeni (2005) estimate that for people age 51 to 61 reporting a work limiting disability, 36% of 
them became disabled due to a workplace injury, illness or accident.  
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employment protection laws.  Due to these interactions, the impact of employment protection 
on someone disabled at work could differ substantially from that of someone with a prior 
disability or a nonwork disability.  This provides a useful opportunity to investigate the 
impact of overlapping regulatory and litigation based policies targeting the employment of 
disabled workers. 
This paper studies how overlap between workers’ compensation coverage and 
employment protection affect the labor market outcomes of the disabled.  Central to our 
analysis is the idea that the accommodations required by employment protection policies can 
reduce the expected costs associated with workers compensation benefits that employers must 
pay to injured workers.  This implies that some of the employer costs of complying with the 
employment protection laws will be offset by lower workers’ compensation costs.  Thus, 
policies that protect the disabled from discrimination will be more effective when applied to 
those workers who become disabled through a workplace injury or illness. 
  The complementarity of employment protection and workers’ compensation is tested 
using data on employment, disability status and workers’ compensation benefit receipt from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS).  While past studies have primarily studied the impact of 
the ADA, we focus on the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).  In many 
ways FEHA mirrors the ADA, but it actually predates the ADA and offers stronger 
protections to the disabled.  Additionally, the FEHA was revised in 2001 to place stricter 
requirements on employers to provide accommodations.  After this reform, the number of 
allegations under FEHA that an employer failed to accommodate a disability more than 
doubled.  This provides a natural experiment in which to examine the employment impact of 
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FEHA on the disabled and how the impact differs for those with and without a workplace 
injury. 
  Our empirical analysis employs a difference-in-differences strategy that compares the 
labor force participation of disabled workers’ compensation recipients relative to disabled 
workers without workers’ compensation benefits before and after the changes to FEHA.  The 
findings generally support the predictions of the model.  Specifically, we find that the labor 
force participation of workers’ compensation recipients rose relative to that of other disabled 
workers after the employment protection provisions of FEHA were strengthened.  The results 
appear to be largely driven by male workers, who are more likely to be subject to 
accommodations.  Robustness checks indicate that there was no comparable trend in the 
employment of disabled workers’ compensation recipients relative to other disabled workers 
outside of California during this time period. 
  These findings indicate that employment protection can have a positive impact on the 
labor market outcomes of the disabled, something which the prior literature has failed to 
demonstrate empirically.  However, the effects appear to be limited to certain subgroups of 
the disabled population, which may help explain why the existing literature finds little effect.  
From the perspective of social welfare, the enhanced effect of the employment protection 
laws for workers’ compensation recipients could be good or bad.  The welfare effects 
ultimately depend on whether or not the level of accommodation that occurs under the 
litigation system is socially optimal.  If they are, then the additional accommodation for 
workers’ compensation beneficiaries could lead to excess accommodations.  On the other 
hand, if the equilibrium accommodation for workers with nonwork disabilities is suboptimal, 
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then the increase in accommodations for workers’ compensation recipients should be welfare 
enhancing. 
  In the context of the literature studying the interaction between regulatory regimes and 
the court system, this paper provides an example where regulation and litigation appear to be 
complements.
3  Liability and safety regulation are often—though not always—considered 
substitutes, suggesting that combining the two could be redundant and lead to inefficiencies.
4  
For example, Phillipson and Sun (2008) argue that having dual litigation and regulatory 
systems in the case of pharmaceuticals leads to significant welfare losses by increasing the 
cost of prescription drugs without the benefit of increasing safety.  While the welfare 
consequences in our application are still unclear, this paper provides an empirical example 
that the combination of regulation and litigation is not always redundant. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we provide some background on 
employment protection litigation and workers’ compensation.  In particular, we describe the 
California FEHA and the changes that were enacted in 2001.  In Section C we develop a 
model that illustrates how the consequences of employment protection for disabled workers 
can differ depending on whether or not a worker was disabled due to workplace injury.  
Section D describes our empirical approach and the data, and Section E presents and discusses 
our empirical results.  The paper concludes with a brief discussion of next steps and 
implications for future work. 
                                                 
3 We take employment protection to be the litigation system and workers’ compensation to be the regulation 
system in our example, because the penalties in employment discrimination cases are often leveled in civil court 
whereas workers’ compensation benefits are prescribed ex ante.  In truth, however, there are aspects of 
employment protection that operate like a regulatory system, and aspects of workers’ compensation that operate 
like a system of litigation.  We clarify how our application differs from a traditional model of regulation and 
litigation, and how this affects the implications of our findings, later in the paper.   
4 Litigation and regulation are not always considered redundant, at least theoretically.  Kolstad, Ulen and 
Johnson (1990) and Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2009) show how the combination of regulation and litigation 
can correct inefficiencies in liability or regulation alone, and lead to improved outcomes. 
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B. Background 
 
This paper is concerned with the interaction between workers’ compensation benefits 
and employment protection laws targeting the disabled.  In each case there is a considerable 
amount of variation across the U.S. in the design and scope of both types of policies.  In this 
section we offer a brief discussion of each, with a particular focus on California (which is the 
subject of our empirical analysis). 
Workers’ Compensation 
In the U.S., workers’ compensation laws regulate the compensation offered to workers 
who experience work-related injuries or illnesses.  Coverage by workers’ compensation is 
nearly universal:  all 50 states and the federal government have some form of workers’ 
compensation system, although it is optional in Texas (and to a lesser extent New Jersey).  
There is significant variation in the design of state programs, but there are some similarities in 
the kinds of benefits available to workers.  Typically, employers are required to compensate 
injured workers for all medical expenses, and replace some fraction of lost wages. 
The wage loss benefits, also called indemnity benefits, vary depending on whether the 
injury is permanent or temporary.  Generally there are four types of indemnity benefits: 
temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, 
permanent total disability (PTD) benefits and fatality benefits.  Most attention is typically 
paid to TTD and PPD benefits because they are more common by far.  TTD benefits are paid 
weekly and usually provide approximately two-thirds replacement of the injured worker’s 
pre-injury average wage, subject to weekly benefit caps and floors.  The structure of PPD 
benefits varies more substantially, but they are typically determined as some function of the 
nature and severity of a worker’s disability.  All workers’ compensation benefits are exempt 
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from income tax, so the after-tax replacement rate of lost income can be significantly higher 
than the before-tax rate.
5
In California, the maximum TTD benefits have changed over time.  This fact is 
relevant for our empirical analysis, as we discuss in detail below.  From July 1, 1996 through 
December 31, 2002, the maximum benefit was fixed at $448 per week.  In 2003, 2004 and 
2005, the maximum weekly benefit increased by approximately $120 per year.
6  Beginning in 
2007, weekly benefits have been adjusted annually according to a cost-of-living adjustment 
(COLA) based on the state average weekly wage.  Minimum benefits were fixed at $126 per 
week over this time period, though beginning in 2007 they, too, are adjusted by the COLA.   
In California, temporary benefits are paid until a worker goes back to work or until a 
physician determines that the worker is no longer improving (i.e., the doctor declares their 
condition to be “permanent and stationary”).  If they suffer residual impairment as a result of 
their injury, they will generally be eligible for PPD benefits.  California PPD benefits are 
determined according to a schedule that assigns a disability rating (from 1 to 100) to injured 
workers based on the body part that was injured, the severity of the resulting impairment to 
the function of the body part, as well as the age and occupation at the time of the injury.  The 
maximum benefits for PPD are determined in part by the disability rating, but they are 
generally much smaller than TTD benefits (almost always less than $300 per week). 
For our purposes, an important distinction between TTD and PPD benefits in 
California is that only TTD benefits are dependent on current labor force participation.  PPD 
                                                 
5 For example, Viscusi and Moore (1987) estimated that that the before-tax replacement rate was 55% compared 
to 83% after taxes. 
6 Specifically, the weekly benefits rose to $602 in 2003, $728 in 2004 and $840 in 2005. 
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benefits are the same regardless of whether or not an employee is currently employed.
7  Thus, 
from the standpoint of thinking about how accommodating an injured worker and bringing 
them back to work early might affect workers’ compensation costs, only TTD benefits are 
truly relevant. 
Employment Protection for the Disabled 
  Probably the best known policy that protects the disabled from discrimination in the 
U.S. is the ADA.  The ADA was enacted in 1991, but Title I, which provided employment 
protection for workers at employers with 25 or more employees, did not become effective 
until July, 1992.  In addition to explicitly barring discrimination in hiring, firing, promotion, 
pay or other employment practices, the ADA also requires employers to provide “reasonable” 
accommodations to the worksite for disabled workers or prospective workers.  These may 
include but are not limited to:
8
•  Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by persons with 
disabilities.  
•  Job restructuring, modifying work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position;  
•  Acquiring or modifying equipment or devices, adjusting or modifying examinations, training materials, 
or policies, and providing qualified readers or interpreters. 
 
More generally, the ADA requires employers to provide accommodations that do not 
constitute an “undue hardship” on their operation. 
  While the ADA is perhaps the most widely known policy, it is not the only or even the 
first.  There are many state policies, some of which predate the ADA.  One example of this is 
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).  FEHA protects individuals 
against harassment or discrimination in employment and housing because of a disability and 
                                                 
7 Starting in 2006 the law was changed to implement a tiered benefit structure that reduced PPD benefits if 
employers make an offer of return to work, and increased them if they did not.  However, this difference was 
contingent entirely on the offer of return to work, and the levels do not change regardless of whether the 
employee accepted the job or accepted employment somewhere else. 
8 These examples were provided by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/types/ada.html, accessed on August 31, 2008. 
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numerous other characteristics, including age, gender, race, and religion.
9  FEHA was first 
passed in 1959 and has changed many times over the years, but laws preventing 
discrimination against the disabled began to be incorporated in the 1970s. 
  Under FEHA, employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations to 
employees with disabilities in order to enable them to perform their essential job functions 
just as under the ADA.  As part of this requirement, employers are required to participate in 
an “interactive process” with their disabled employees to determine if reasonable 
accommodations can be made which would allow the employee to continue working.  In 
2001, California revised the FEHA through Assembly Bill 2222 (AB2222).
10 AB2222 
expanded FEHA’s broad definition of disability and it clarified that mitigating measures (such 
as medications or devices such as glasses) are to be excluded from disability determination.  
  The FEHA in California also provides for a definition of disability more 
encompassing than does the ADA and most other states. The FEHA provides protections for 
individuals with a “limitation” on a major life activity while the ADA and many states only a 
“substantial limitation.”  Also, the FEHA does not allow mitigation measures to be considered 
in the definition of disability, extends protections to smaller businesses than does the ADA. 
The FEHA provides for higher potential damage awards than does the ADA and most other 
states. In almost every dimension the FEHA provides greater protections to a broader range of 
disabled persons than does nearly every other state.  Some of the differences in definition of 
disability were removed in the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008. 
Among other things, the act no longer allows for mitigation measures other than 
glasses/contact lenses to be considered in the determination of disability status.
                                                 
9 Fair Employment and Housing Act (Title 2, Division 3, Part 2.8) 
10 AB 2222, Chapter 1049, Civil Code sections 51, 51.5, 54 and CA Government Codes 12926, 12940, 12955.3, 
and 19231 
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The most important aspect of FEHA for this paper is the change brought about by 
AB2222 that enhanced employers’ responsibilities for initiating an interactive process with 
disabled employees.  Essentially, after AB2222 if an employer fails to engage in an 
interactive process this can serve as sufficient grounds for a cause of action against the 
employer.  While the ADA requires a similar process, it is not sufficient to show liability on 
its own.  Obviously a worker would still have to show harm in order to recover any damages, 
but making the failure to engage sufficient grounds for a lawsuit substantially increases the 
access of disabled workers to the court system (as we demonstrate below).  To our 
knowledge, this provision of FEHA makes California one of the most, if not the most, 
aggressive states in terms of requiring employers to accommodate disabled workers. 
When do Employment Protection Laws and Workers’ Compensation Overlap? 
  Ostensibly the two systems described above target completely different issues.  
However, both are intensely concerned with the employment outcomes of someone after they 
experience a workplace injury.  A failure to return injured workers back to work in a timely 
fashion will lead to both higher workers’ compensation benefits and could increase an 
employer’s exposure to antidiscrimination litigation.  This is the key relationship between the 
two programs for our purposes, because it suggests that accommodating disabled workers in 
accordance with employment protection laws can reduce the amount employers have to pay in 
workers’ compensation benefits.  
  The intuition behind this prediction is that accommodations that make it easier for a 
disabled worker to perform their duties also make it easier for workers’ to return to work at an 
earlier date.  Such accommodations might include modifying the set of tasks so as to avoid 
particularly physical work, or some kind of worksite or physical modification.  We do not 
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necessarily think that these accommodations affect the actual recovery time of disabled 
workers.  Rather, we argue that workers have the ability to modify the date at which they 
return to work, and by taking extra steps to accommodate workers employers can accelerate 
that date.  
There is some empirical support for the idea that accommodations will reduce the 
employer costs of workplace injuries.  It is clear that workers have some ability to choose 
when to return to work, as shown by numerous studies finding that the duration of work-
injury absences is positively related to the benefit level (c.f., Meyer et. al, 1995; Neuhauser 
and Raphael, 2004; Kruger, 1990; Galizzi and Boden, 1996; Butler and Worral, 1985; Worral 
and Butler 1985; Johnson and Ondrich, 1990).  The direct evidence on the effect of 
accommodations is limited, but there is some evidence from past studies that employer return 
to work programs reduce the time out of work (c.f.,Butler, Baldwin and Johnson, 1995; Loisel 
et al., 1996; Bernacki et al., 2000; Krause et al., 1998).  These programs typically involve 
modifications to work tasks, equipment or scheduling, all of which are items that may be 
required by the employment protection policies. 
Another, potentially more direct, way in which workers’ compensation and 
employment protection statutes for the disabled might interact is through second injury funds 
(SIFs).  SIFs were created as a means to encourage the hiring of disabled workers by 
alleviating employer concerns that workers’ with preexisting conditions might exacerbate the 
likelihood or severity of a future injury.  SIFs operate by either reimbursing employers (or 
insurers) for payments made to eligible claims or by simply appropriating the claim and 
making the payments directly.  In this sense, SIFs and employment protection have similar 
implications for the employment of the disabled: SIFs offer incentives to reduce 
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discrimination against disabled workers, whereas employment protection policies offer legal 
protection if discrimination is thought to have occurred.  However, it is possible that SIFs 
offer additional protection to disabled workers by reducing the incentives of employers to 
challenge claims on the basis of compensability.
11
As discussed in Uehlein and Nevils (2008) since the adoption of the ADA many states 
have begun to close their SIFs, under the argument that the protections provided against 
discrimination make the funds redundant.  This potentially could increase the degree of 
overlap between employment protection and workers’ compensation cases, because 
employers will face greater workers’ compensation costs associated with disabling injuries 
related to preexisting conditions.  In California there is the Subsequent Injuries Fund which 
covers approximately 500 claims a year at a cost of approximately $6.5 million.
12  However, 
the provisions of the fund did not change significantly around the time of the changes to 
FEHA that we use in our empirical test, so we do not think it affects our identification.  
Nonetheless, the elimination of SIFs could have important implications for the overlap 
between workers’ compensation and employment protection for workers in affected states 
such as New York and Florida. 
  In a typical study of the relationship between regulation and litigation, the overlap 
between the functions of the two systems is more direct than is the case here.  The regulatory 
system requires a certain type of behavior and imposes fines and penalties for deviation from 
that behavior (if the deviation is detected).  Litigation provides a means for individuals to 
                                                 
11 Under an SIF, employers have no incentive (or reduced incentives) to contest a workers’ compensation claim 
for a worker with a preexisting condition on the basis of causality.  This is not the case with employment 
protection, in that employers have just as much (if not more) incentives to contest compensability.  We thank 
Richard Butler for suggesting this implication of SIFs. 
12 This information is available from the California Division of Workers’ Compensation (DWC) at 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/DWC/basics.htm (accessed October 15, 2009). 
  11Preliminary draft.  Please do not quote or cite. 
recover compensation if they are harmed as a result of behavior that deviates from the 
“reasonable” level set by the courts.  In our case, the workers’ compensation system is not a 
true ex ante regulatory system.  Rather, it indirectly regulates accommodations by imposing a 
penalty (disability benefits) on employers when they fail to accommodate injured workers.  
This will be important to note when we discuss the policy implications of our findings.   
C. Conceptual Framework 
 
  Previous studies of the impact of employment protection on labor market outcomes for 
the disabled have tended to focus on the aggregate employment and wage effects.  For 
instance, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) develop a model of the labor market for disabled 
workers and use it to show that the theoretical impact of the ADA on employment is 
ambiguous.  While the ADA subsidizes hiring costs that should promote the employment of 
the disabled, it simultaneously imposes ex ante expected costs to firms hiring disabled 
workers by raising the costs of firing them.   
However, while the general equilibrium effect of their model is to reduce employment, 
Acemoglu and Angrist acknowledge that the partial equilibrium effects could be much 
different.  In particular, by increasing firing costs and requiring accommodation, the ADA 
could increase retention of already employed workers who become disabled due to a health 
shock.  This is important for our purposes, because we hypothesize that the primary impact of 
the overlap between employment protection and workers’ compensation receipt should be on 
the retention of newly disabled workers. 
In this paper, we argue that the existence of the workers’ compensation system 
reinforces this retention effect for those workers who become disabled due to a workplace 
injury.  Suppose that individual i is employed and has marginal productivity equal to θit, 
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where   if she is disabled in time t and   if she is not.  The disabled are 
assumed to be less productive in most jobs, so  .  In a fully competitive market, 
wages would equal marginal product.  However, suppose there are equal pay provisions that 
prevent employers from offering different wages based on disability status, so 
D
it θ θ =
H
it θ θ =
D H θ θ ≥
w wi =  for all i 
regardless of marginal product.
13  If we assume that 
D H w θ θ > >  we have the extreme case 
where a firm always wants to hire nondisabled workers but never wants to hire disabled 
workers. 
  The Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) model generated turnover by incorporating 
exogenous productivity shocks for all workers.  In our model, the only shock we consider is a 
nondisabled worker becoming disabled.  Suppose that each nondisabled worker in period t 
faces the chance of becoming disabled in period  1 + t .  For simplicity, assume that disability 
is an absorbing state.  Once a worker becomes disabled, the employer has two choices: they 
can pay accommodation cost c and retain the disabled worker, or they can fire the disabled 
worker and absorb the associated litigation costs, denoted f.
14  The firing cost is equal to the 
expected cost that comes from a lawsuit that the disabled worker files under the employment 
protection provisions.  Firing cost is assumed to be nonzero and randomly distributed with a 
density function  .  () f g
  In our model, the value of accommodation changes depending on whether or not the 
worker became disabled due to a workplace injury.  If the injury occurred at work, the worker 
is eligible for income replacement benefits during the recovery period.  This cost, which we 
                                                 
13 In this model we ignore the possibility that employers could differentiate job title or description based on 
disability status, which might give them some ability to alter wages.  However, such practices could similarly 
run afoul of provisions that prohibit discrimination in promotion or hiring.  
14 Implicitly we are assuming that marginal productivity of disabled workers is   if the employer 
accommodates and zero otherwise. 
D θ
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denote b, cannot be avoided by firing the worker.  However, benefits are paid weekly, so the 
cost is increasing in the length of time that an injured worker remains out of work.  For the 
reasons discussed earlier, we assume that the time out of work—and thus the cost associated 
with workers’ compensation benefits—can be reduced by making the accommodations, i.e. 
that  .  ) 0 ( b ) c ( b <
 Under these assumptions, an employer will retain the newly disabled worker if: 
() f E c w
D − ≥ − − θ   for nonwork disabilities 
() ( ) f E c b b c w
D − ≥ − + − − ) ( ) 0 ( θ   for work-related disabilities 
If 
D w θ > , then employers always fire disabled workers in the absence of employment 
protection.  Similarly, if employment protection requires accommodations without an 
adequate enforcement mechanism, such as the ability to sue the employer, employers would 
still chose to fire workers and not accommodate.  However, if the firing costs are high 
enough, employers will find it profitable to retain disabled workers even if their marginal 
product is below the required wage.   
  The ability of accommodation costs to offset workers’ compensation costs, as 
represented by  , makes it cheaper for employers to retain disabled workers. ( ) c ( b ) 0 ( b − )
                                                
15  
Essentially, this acts as a subsidy to complying with the guidelines of employment 
accommodation.  This implies that employment protection and workers’ compensation 
recipiency are complements: the threat of a discrimination lawsuit should have a bigger effect 
among workers’ compensation recipients than nonrecipients.   
This hypothesis about the differential impact of employment protection on workers’ 
compensation recipients and nonrecipients motivates our empirical work.  In order to test the 
 
)
15 We rule out the case where ( .  In such a scenario, employers could choose to accommodate 
and still fire the disabled workers. 
c ) c ( b ) 0 ( b > −
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predicted relationship, the ideal experiment would be to observe the employment of workers’ 
compensation recipient compared to nonrecipients with and without any employment 
protection.  However, our empirical test is implemented somewhat differently.   
We do not observe a state of the world with no employment protection; rather, we 
observe employment outcomes before and after a random shock to the strength of 
employment protection.  This can be interpreted in our model as a change in the distribution 
function  , one that leads to an increase in the expected costs of firing a disabled worker.  
This is an important distinction, because the change in the differential impact of employment 
protection is not generally equal to the overall difference; in fact, it need not even have the 
same sign. 
() f g
 Figure 1 illustrates the impact of a hypothetical change in the distribution of firing 
costs on the expected employment of disabled workers.  The functions   and   
represent the distribution of firing costs before and after the change, respectively.  The 
probability a worker is retained for a given value of f is the integral of 
() f g
1 () f g
2
( ) f g  above that value.  
The values   and   represent the respective firing cost thresholds that induce employers 
to retain workers with nonoccupational and occupational disabilities.   
* f
wc f
The area B represents the differential impact of employment protection on workers’ 
compensation recipients before the change.  After the change the differential impact is the 
area  B A+ .  However, the experiment implemented in the empirical work in this paper can 
only identify area A, the difference-in-differences after the change.  While A is positive in our 
example, it is easy to see that this is not necessarily the case.  Practically speaking, A will be 
positive as long as the change in the distribution of firing costs is large enough and as long as 
the threshold values aren’t too low.  If firing costs are low enough before the change, so that 
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area B is small, then the difference identified here will approach the full differential impact of 
the policy after the change. 
Welfare Implications 
  A natural question that arises in our analysis is: Does the result that workers’ 
compensation and employment protection are complements lead to more socially desirable 
outcomes?  The model suggests that workers who become disabled due to a workplace injury 
will receive greater accommodations and experience better employment outcomes.  While this 
is clearly better for the workers’ compensation recipients, it is not immediately clear whether 
or not it is socially optimal. 
  An ideally functioning system would have employers providing the optimal level of 
accommodations to both groups of workers.  The complementary nature of employment 
protection and workers’ compensation could improve social welfare in one of two ways.  If 
we thought that employers were more likely to discriminate against workers’ compensation 
recipients then the implicit subsidy to accommodation could lead to more efficient 
outcomes.
16  Alternatively, suppose that inefficiencies inherent to the liability system (such as 
the high cost of filing a lawsuit) leads to inefficiently low levels of accommodation for all 
disabled workers.  In this case, providing employers with additional incentives to 
accommodate workers’ compensation recipients leads to better outcomes.  Note that these two 
have significantly different policy implications.  With the former, the optimal policy 
prescription would be to find some way to subsidize accommodations for all disabled 
workers.  With the latter, no such intervention is (necessarily) called for. 
                                                 
16 This could happen if, for example, employers discriminated against workers’ compensation recipients in order 
to retaliate against them for filing claims. 
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  From a social perspective, it is also possible that the complementarity between 
workers’ compensation and employment protection actually worsens social welfare.  As is the 
case with many applications of the tort system, the welfare implications of the analysis relies 
crucially on the ability of the courts to identify the socially optimal level of accommodation.  
If the true impact of employment protection is to impose an overly burdensome cost to 
employers, then anything that leads to higher accommodations could lead to a net decline in 
welfare.  Such employer costs could also be exacerbated if the enhanced opportunity for 
discrimination litigation led to an increase in workers’ compensation claims by injured 
workers.
17  Unfortunately, nothing in our empirical work allows us to identify the actual 
welfare consequences of workers’ compensation receipt and employment protection in our 
setting. 
D. Empirical Approach and Data 
  In order to test the predictions of the model above, we need to be able to track workers 
over time, observe whether they are disabled, employed or receive workers’ compensation.  
We also need to observe an exogenous shock to the costs associated with a failure to 
accommodate injured workers, and observe how this alters employment of the two groups.  
Because we are focusing on a policy change in California, we also need to be able to measure 
these things for workers by state. 
  The primary source of data that we use is the March Current Population Survey (CPS).  
The CPS includes information on employment outcomes, demographics, state, disability and 
health status, and workers’ compensation benefit receipt.  For a subsample of the population, 
                                                 
17 In our sample, we found no evidence that the rate of workers’ compensation claims changed after the changes 
to FEHA were introduced. 
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it is possible to match observations across two years, allowing us to study changes in labor 
force participation.  Additionally, the CPS is a relatively large database, allowing us to obtain 
reasonable sample size even though we focus on a single state. 
  Our main outcome of interest is the post-disability employment of workers.  Because 
our model specifically considers changes in separation rates from employers, we need to 
know the worker was employed in the initial period.  Because the matched CPS sample has 
two periods of data, we limit our sample to people who are employed in the first period and 
then use employment in the second period as our primary outcome measure.  Employment in 
both periods is defined as having reported working at least one week in the year. 
  The key policy change for us is the revision to the FEHA in 2001,
18 which we 
interpret as an exogenous increase in f.  The empirical hypothesis that we are testing is that 
the impact on employment should differ according to whether or not a disabled worker 
receives workers’ compensation benefits.  This lends itself to a difference-in-differences 
specification.  The differences we employ are: pre and post introduction to the reform, with 
and without workers compensation benefits, and disabled versus not disabled.  The estimating 
equation we employ is: 
  Employedit+1 = β*xit + γ t + α*disabledit + b*wcit + ω*disabledit*wcit + 
δ*disabledit*postit + η*wcit*postit + θ*disabledit*postit*wcit + ρ*disabled it+1 + 
ε it+1
In the model, x represents important demographic characteristics such as age, gender and 
education, γ represents the impact of time trends (which we implement as year fixed-effects), 
wc represents an indicator for workers’ compensation receipt, disabled is an indicator for 
                                                 
18 While the change was enacted in 2001, for reasons discussed in detail below, we actually don’t think the 
change had much effect until 2002. 
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disability status, and post is an indicator for the time period corresponding to the post-reform 
period.  The parameter θ identifies the effect of FEHA on people who were disabled and who 
received workers compensation benefits.  If the interaction of workers’ compensation and 
employment protection increases the likelihood that a worker is retained then the expected 
sign of this coefficient is positive. 
  In order for θ to be identified in our model, we need to ensure that we capture the 
impact of the changes to FEHA and not some other factor that occurred around the same time, 
such as changes to the workers’ compensation system.  In fact, as discussed above, there were 
changes to the workers' compensation law in California that increased the level of TTD 
benefits paid to injured workers beginning in 2002.  This is potentially a matter of concern, 
but we do not think that this confounds our our results because (1) we don't think that it 
should have had a different effect for disabled or non-disabled workers' compensation 
claimants (meaning, any effect should be picked up by the other terms in our difference-in-
differences specification), (2) we have a separate control for the replacement rate of disability 
benefits, which should capture much of the relevant variation from the benefit change, and (3) 
the effect of a benefit increase actually works against our predicted effect—if benefits 
increase, the labor supply of workers’ compensation claimants should fall—suggesting our 
results could be conservative.   
There were other reforms that led to other changes in California, cutting PPD benefits 
and replacing vocational rehabilitation with a voucher program.   These changes did not take 
effect until 2004 or later, however.  To further verify that we are isolating the impact of 
changes to FEHA, we break our estimated effects down by year and replicate our analysis 
dropping years 2004 and later. 
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  To implement this analysis, there are several key measurement issues that must be 
considered.  First, we are basing our test off the assertion that the changes brought about by 
AB2222 significantly increased the expected costs associated with releasing a disabled 
worker.  It is important to both (1) verify that AB2222 did increase firing costs associated 
with a failure to accommodate and (2) pinpoint when these increased costs started to arise.  
Second, we must settle on an appropriate definition of disability.  Finally, there are some 
issues typically associated with matching the CPS data across years.  We discuss each of these 
issues in turn. 
Measuring the Timing and Effect of the Reforms 
  To investigate whether or not the changes to the FEHA increased incentives to firms 
to perform interactive processes, we acquired micro-level data from the California 
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH).  The DFEH is the administrative body 
charged with overseeing the implementation of FEHA.  In order to have a right to sue under 
FEHA, for disability or other types of discrimination, a complaint must first be filed with the 
DFEH.  These data are collected for everyone alleging an act of discrimination, regardless of 
whether the DFEH is involved in the resolution, or if the claim is litigated. 
  We received data from DFEH on all claims alleging discrimination on the basis of 
disability, gender or race or ethnicity from 1997 through 2007.  These data contain both the 
basis for the claim (gender/race/disability) as well as the alleged acts for the claim (refusal to 
hire/refusal to accommodate etc).   We received data on 107,703 total claims, of which 32,923 
(approximately 31%) involved alleged discrimination on the basis of disability.  Of the 
disability claims, 11,790 (approximately 36%) alleged a failure to accommodate by the 
employer. In addition to the data from the DFEH, we retrieved data on the number of charges 
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made at the federal level to the EEOC for employment discrimination from 1997 to 2007
19. 
Of the 82,792 charges to the EEOC in 2007, 17,734 (21.4%) involved a claim of 
discrimination due to disability, substantially less than equivalent percentage in California. 
  Figure 2 illustrates the trends in the growth in the number of both California and 
Federal discrimination claims by basis of claim from 1997 to 2007.  The vertical axis 
represents the percent change between the number of claims reported in the current year and 
in the baseline year (1997).  As we can see, the number of claims in California alleging 
discrimination for non-disability bases displays a declining trend over time.  In particular, 
there is a noticeable decline after 2003, with the total number of claims in 2007 declining 
approximately 25% from its 1997 level.  This trend stands in sharp contrast to the growth in 
the number of disability discrimination claims in California over the same period.  The 
number of disability claims displays a small amount of growth form 1997 to 2000, but there is 
a sharp decline in 2001 and then even more in 2002, until the trend levels off.  By 2007, the 
total number of disability discrimination claims in California was approximately 62% higher 
than the number in 1997. 
 In  Figure 3 we examine the growth in the number of Federal discrimination claims 
reported to the EEOC over the same period.  The overall setup of the figure is identical to that 
of Figure 2.  It is clear from the figure that there is little or no comparable trend in Federal 
discrimination cases over the same period.  Federal claims alleging discrimination for non-
disability bases show a brief increase in 2002 with a slight decline thereafter.  Federal 
disability claims actually drop steadily between 1997 and 2005, declining as much as 18% in 
2005.  There is an increase after that that brings the total number back very close to that in the 
baseline year (down approximately 2% in 2007). 
                                                 
19 http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html: accessed August 12, 2009. 
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  Our analysis is predicated on the idea that the changes brought about by AB 2222 
make it easer to allege that an employer failed to reasonably accommodate a disability.  In 
Figure 4 we compare the changes in the number of claims alleging a refusal to accommodate 
to changes in the number of other types of disability claims.  As with Figure 2 and Figure 3, 
the values are measured as percent difference from the baseline year (1997).  The series 
“Total Net of Accommodations” represents changes in disability discrimination claims that 
did not allege any failure to accommodate.   
The figure illustrates that a majority of the growth in disability discrimination claims 
after AB2222 was, indeed, driven by allegations of refusal to accommodate.  The number of 
claims alleging a refusal to accommodate jumped from approximately 21% greater than the 
baseline value in 2000 to 39% greater in 2001 to 75% greater in 2002.  Moreover, this change 
is persists throughout subsequent years, with an additional spurt of growth in 2005 and 
2006.
20  In 2007, the number of claims alleging a refusal to accommodate was 131% higher 
than in 1997.  However, while there was growth in the number of other types of disability 
allegations over this time period, the growth is both less pronounced and less persistent. 
  These figures help support two points that are critical to our analysis.  The first point is 
that AB2222 did lead to a significant increase in claims for disability discrimination.  Not 
only do we see an increase in disability discrimination claims after AB 2002 passes, but the 
trend appears to be mostly uncorrelated with any general trend in the filing for discrimination 
claims at the state or federal level.  This suggests that employers likely did view the change as 
increasing the likelihood of being sued.  Second, the changes were not immediate, and did not 
                                                 
20 This latter period of growth may be due to changes in the workers’ compensation, particularly the repeal of 
vocational rehabilitation benefits.  A key part of the vocational rehabilitation system was the vocational 
rehabilitation counselor, the job of whom was generally seen to be consistent with engaging workers in an 
interactive process.  The absence of a vocational rehabilitation counselor may have helped spur an additional 
increase in the number of refusal to accommodate claims. 
  22Preliminary draft.  Please do not quote or cite. 
appear to take full effect until at least several months had passed.  Therefore, in our empirical 
work, we focus on before 2001 and after 2001 in our analysis (essentially treating 2002 as the 
year of enactment). 
Defining Disability Status 
  An important empirical challenge facing many studies that center on the labor market 
outcomes of the disabled is finding an appropriate measure of disability status to use.  Many 
surveys include questions about the work limitations of individuals.  The relevant question in 
the CPS is: 
(Do you/Does anyone in this household) have a health problem or disability which prevents (you/them) 
from working or which limits the kind or amount of work (you/they) can do? 
 
While economists are often required to rely on self-reported information, self-reported 
disability can be problematic in labor market studies because of the possibility that reported 
disability status is influenced by labor force participation.  For example, if one is working, 
they may be less likely to report having a disability even if they have some form of functional 
limitation. 
Reporting biases in disability status have been shown to have a significant impact on 
past work.  Hotchkiss (2003; 2004) argues that the results of past studies suggesting that the 
ADA led to worse employment outcomes for the disabled in fact reflected changes in the 
propensity of individuals to report being disabled.  Nonparticipants in the labor force became 
more likely to claim that they were disabled after the adoption in ADA, possibly in response 
to concurrent changes in welfare laws and more generous disability benefits.  The potential 
for such bias is troubling for our purposes because we are focusing on individuals who are 
working (at least in the first period). 
  23Preliminary draft.  Please do not quote or cite. 
  To avoid the possibility reporting biases, we use self-reported health status as an 
alternative definition of disability for our analysis.
21  We define someone as being 
disabled when they respond as having fair or poor health.  While we are still relying on a 
self-reported measure of health limitations, because the question does not directly ask 
about employment the answer is more likely to be independent of current labor force 
participation.  However, having fair or poor health is very highly correlated with self-
reported disability status (approximately two-thirds of those reporting fair or poor health 
also report having a work limitation), so we think it captures the relevant variation in the 
ability to work.
22
Matching the CPS Data 
  While the CPS is not a true panel, portions of the sample can be linked across years.  
This approach has been used in past studies of workers’ compensation (Kruger, 1990) and 
employment protection (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001).  About one half of the CPS population 
for a particular year can be matched to the next year.  A limitation to matching is that because 
it is a household survey, actual individuals are not identified.  Rather, respondents are 
identified by their household and their place within the household.  However, this can differ 
from year to year due to changes in the makeup of households (this can happen because of 
death, change in marital status, etc.). 
  The CPS contains a number of demographic characteristics that can be used to 
increase the accuracy of the match (such as age and gender).  We initially match on household 
                                                 
21 In this case, the relevant question we use is: Would you say (name's/your) health in general is Excellent, Very 
good, Good, Fair, Poor? 
22 In the appendix we show that if we adopt the more standard definition of disability we obtain similar effects, 
in the sense that they have the predicted sign, though they are smaller in magnitude and not statistically 
significant.   
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id and line number. Next, we make sure that the potential match has not changed gender or 
race/ethnicity. Lastly, we make sure that the potential match is one year older in the second 
year than they were in the first year. This matching strategy results in a match rate of 
approximately 40%.  While lower than the highest possible match rate of 50%, it leaves us 
confident that those people we have matched across years are very likely the same person. 
  Table 1 compares the matched sample to the entire CPS sample for California from 
1996-2007.  Note that we restrict the sample to the 21-55 age population, to focus on the 
prime labor market years.  Overall, the matched sample appears quite close to the overall full 
sample.  The percent of disabled workers is approximately 8.8% in the full sample and in the 
matched sample. The population with workers compensation is 1.51% in the entire sample 
and a slightly higher 1.63% in the matched sample. All other demographic variables are 
within a percentage point or two in the entire versus matched sample. 
  The final column of the table provides summary statistics for the disabled population 
in the matched sample.  As we expect, employment outcomes for the disabled are 
substantially worse than for the general population. In particular, the employment rate for the 
disabled population is 55.73%, compared with 83.06% for the full sample.  The rate of 
workers’ compensation receipt is 5.51% among the disabled, significantly higher than among 
the nondisabled population.   
  Before moving on to discuss the empirical results, we first consider the transitions 
from health status between years.  Table 2 illustrates the reported disability status in the 
second period for matched individuals based on their reported disability status in the first 
period.  Someone who is not disabled in the first period becomes disabled in the second 
period about 5.8% of the time.  On the other hand, someone who is disabled in the first period 
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reports a disability in the second period just 45.92% of times.  This indicates that over half of 
reported disabilities are temporary.   
  This point is of interest partly because it confirms our earlier argument that disability 
is far from static for most people, but it also has implications for our analysis.  Disabilities can 
vary in terms of their severity as well as their persistence over time.  Obviously the 
employment consequences of a disability will be driven in part by disability severity.  What 
could be problematic for our purposes is the possibility that disabilities associated with 
workplace injuries are systematically different in terms of severity than other disabilities.  We 
control for this partly with our difference in differences specification, which should eliminate 
any systematic differences between workers’ compensation and other disabling injuries that 
are constant over time.  However, we further control for differences in disability severity by 




  Table 3 reports our central estimates for the differential employment effect of 
employment protection for workers’ compensation recipients.  The top panel reports results 
for all workers in our estimation sample, while the bottom panel reports results for men 
only.
24  We report results for three specifications: one with no fixed effects, one with fixed 
effects for county, and the other with fixed effects for the occupation of the job reported in the 
first period.  We estimate a linear probability model, so the coefficients can be interpreted as 
                                                 
23 In principle, we could include the full set of self-reported health outcomes in the second period.  We have 
experimented with this and it did not significantly change our findings. 
24 The sample size for female workers’ compensation recipients in California is too small to make it feasible to 
show results for females only. 
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percentage point differences.  The other dependent variables in this model, and all other 
subsequent models, include controls for age, gender (in the model with both males and 
females), race, ethnicity, education, wage in the first year, the after-tax replacement rate of 
lost income from the workers’ compensation system,
25 and year fixed effects.
26 Robust 
standard errors are reported, with clustering at the level used for the fixed effect.
27
  The results of Table 3 indicate that the adoption of AB2222 significantly increased the 
likelihood of employment in the second period for disabled workers who received workers’ 
compensation in the first period relative to those who were disabled and did not receive 
workers’ compensation.  Ignoring the models with fixed effects, the difference is 0.355 for the 
full sample and 0.542 for the sample that just includes men.  The results are very consistent 
across the different fixed effects specifications. 
We suspect that the difference is higher for men because, on average, they are more 
likely to be employed in physical jobs that may be more likely to require accommodation.  
However, we do note that with this explanation we might expect some change when we 
include occupation fixed effects.  The fact that we observe no such change in our analysis 
could indicate that some other explanation is more relevant. 
In addition to the main interaction effect indicating the impact of the change to FEHA, 
Table 3 also reports the coefficients for the direct effects of workers’ compensation and 
disability.  As expected these direct effects are negative.  However, it is perhaps somewhat 
surprising that the interaction between workers’ compensation and disability status is also 
                                                 
25 The after-tax replacement rate is computed as a fraction of wages (two-thirds in California) of pre-injury 
weekly wage subject to minimum and maximum amounts, and covert the benefits to after-tax status using the 
average tax rate in the state.  Data on taxes come from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/), and the information on minimum and maximum benefit levels are taken from 
the Chamber of Commerce annual Analysis of Workers’ Compensation Laws. 
26 Here we only report the primary coefficients of interest, but in an appendix we include the full set of 
covariates for our preferred model. 
27 The level of clustering appears to have no significant impact on the standard errors in our analysis. 
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negative.  The model in the previous section indicates that disabled workers’ compensation 
recipients subject to FEHA should have better employment outcomes.  However, we expect 
that the negative effect could be attributed to a correlation with disability severity, as past 
work has shown that injury severity is highly correlated with filing for workers’ compensation 
benefits (Biddle and Roberts, 2003; Lakdawalla et al., 2007). 
The dependent variable in this specification focuses only on whether or not the 
individual worked at all in the year.  While this specification fits our conceptual model it is 
somewhat restrictive, because a majority of workers employed in year 1 are also employed in 
year 2; approximately 95% of the nondisabled workers in our sample and 86% of the disabled 
workers are employed in year 2.  As an alternative model, we use the actual number of weeks 
worked as the dependent variable, and report the results in Table 4.  The findings are 
consistent with the previous specification.  Disabled workers’ compensation recipients work 
about 17-18 more weeks relative to nonparticipants in the post-reform period.  If we focus on 
men only, the effect is an increase of about 28-29 weeks worked. 
  Figure 2 and Figure 3 both indicate that the increase in disability discrimination claims 
was most pronounced in 2002 and was fairly persistent afterwards.  We also know there were 
other changes to the workers’ compensation system that took place in 2004 that might have 
affected employment for the disabled.  Thus, if the effect that we find is really attributable to 
the adoption of AB2222 we would expect to see an effect in 2002 that persisted over time.  In 
Table 5 we report results from an alternative specification that allows the effect to vary over 
time.  Specifically, we interact each year from 2001 through 2006 with the interaction term 
between workers’ compensation benefit receipt and disability status.  As before, we present 
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separate results for all workers and for men, and report the results with and without county 
and occupation fixed effects. 
  From the table we see that there is no significant effect in 2001.  If anything, the effect 
appears to be negative.  Beginning in 2002, there appears to be a positive effect that is mostly 
consistent over time.  For all workers, four of the interaction terms from 2002-2006 are 
positive and three are positive and significant.  For men, four are positive and significant.  The 
only anomaly appears to be 2005, which is negative but not significant for all workers and for 
men.
28   
  Taken together, the results of Tables 3, 4 and 5 indicate that the employment outcomes 
of disabled workers who received workers’ compensation benefits improved significantly 
after reforms increased the level of protection the disabled received against discrimination.  
The effect size appears quite large; given that approximately 86 percent of the disabled are 
employed in the second year, these effects indicate approximately a 40% increase in the 
likelihood of employment, even larger for men.  However, given that the increase in 
allegations indicated in Figures 2 and 4 was so large, perhaps it is not surprising that the 
estimated employment effect is also large.   Although not reported here, we have examined 
the impact of the reform on wages, but the effect was insignificant.  This is consistent with the 
setup of the model, which is based on the idea that the primary effect of workers’ 
compensation is to offset the costs of accommodations that affect the likelihood that a worker 
is employed. 
We cannot directly test for the impact of the changes to FEHA on employment, 
because we do not observe the expected costs associated with a claim for any particular 
                                                 
28 As an alternative approach, we simply estimated the model dropping years 2005 and later.  This approach 
provided qualitatively identical results, in that we found a positive effect on employment of disabled workers’ 
compensation recipients in the post-reform period. 
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worker.  Therefore, it is important to verify that the effects we find are not driven by more 
general trends in the employment outcomes of the disabled.  To do so, we duplicated our 
analysis using the matched CPS sample for workers outside of California, which should be 
unaffected by changes to FEHA.  In addition, we restricted the non-California sample just to 
the western states (Washington, Oregon, Arizona, Nevada and New Mexico—the western 
seaboard and states that border California), to capture the effects of any regional trends.  The 
specification of the all dependent and independent variables is the same as in Table 3. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6.  The top panel reports results for 
the full U.S., while the bottom reports results for the western states.  As before, we present 
results using no fixed effects and fixed effects for county and occupation, though in Table 6 
we only report the primary coefficient of interest (the interaction term for workers’ 
compensation receipt with disability status and the post period).  As the table reports, we find 
no statistically significant changes in the employment of disabled workers’ compensation 
recipients after 2002.  This is true for the entire U.S. and for the western states.  In all cases 
the coefficients are small, statistically insignificant, and have the wrong sign.  All of these 
facts help suggest that the results we find are not part of a larger regional trend, and instead 
are associated with the change in the disability laws in California.  
In Table 7 we replicate the analysis allowing the effects to vary by year.  The sample 
size for the western states only is comparatively small, so we restrict this analysis to the full 
U.S. population only.  As before, the effect sizes are smaller, statistically insignificant and 
generally have the wrong sign.  This further supports the notion that the effects we find in our 
analysis are driven by a California-specific change to the labor market experience of disabled 
workers’ compensation recipients and not reflective of some general trend.  While we cannot 
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completely rule out the possibility of another explanation, the timing of the effect and the 
general lack of an effect outside of California suggests that our findings are causally 
attributable to the changes in FEHA brought about by AB2222.   
F. Conclusions 
  This paper studies the interaction between policies that protect disabled workers from 
discrimination and policies that mandate compensation for workplace injuries, and how this 
influences the employment of disabled workers.  We predict that workers’ compensation 
claimants should be more sensitive to changes in employment protection policies, specifically 
an exogenous increase in the costs associated with firing a disabled worker.  We test this 
hypothesis using changes to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) 
making it easier for disabled workers to sue their employers for a failure to accommodate.  
The findings suggest that, as we suspected, workers’ compensation recipients appeared to 
benefit more than other disabled workers from this policy change. 
  Often when comparing a private policy enforced through litigation with a regulatory 
public policy we are concerned with redundancy, but in this particular instance the overlap 
between the two systems actually helps to make the private litigation system more effective.  
In the broader context of studying the interaction between regulation and litigation, one aspect 
of our application that is somewhat unusual is that we are not considering the canonical 
example of overlap between ex ante regulation and ex post litigation over the same behavior.  
Nevertheless, we feel our results provide some insight into cases where the overlap between a 
regulatory system and a litigation system could be beneficial.   
More generally, the addition of ex post taxes or subsidies for a regulatory system can 
help attain better outcomes when the socially optimal activity level varies across different 
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subsets of the population.  Such could be the case in our example if, in an example discussed 
previously, employers are more likely to discriminate against workers’ compensation 
claimants as a form of retaliation for filing a claim.  There are other possible applications 
where this combination of ex post regulatory fines and litigation could generate socially 
optimal outcomes.  Suppose, for example, that producers are subject to litigation if they 
pollute and impose external harm on private residents.  Further suppose that the pollution has 
greater social harm in certain areas (e.g., a wetland) that will not be reflected in the private 
harm experienced by residents (and thus compensated by the litigation system).  In such a 
case, social welfare could potentially be improved by allowing litigation and imposing a 
regulatory regime in the more sensitive area.  That is not to say that this approach is the only 
way to achieve optimal outcomes in this example—an appropriately set Pigovian tax could 
achieve the same outcome—but it is an illustration of how a regulatory system and a litigation 
system can be used in a complementary fashion to improve social welfare. 
  There are numerous ways in which the work here can be expanded upon.  The 
preliminary findings here do little to control for other important factors, such as firm size, that 
could affect the results.  In addition, the CPS tracks individuals for such a short time that we 
have a very fixed window to track changes in labor force participation and separation.  We 
will explore using panel data to consider a longer time horizon.  Finally, while we focus on 
FEHA because of the specific changes in accommodation requirements, we might also expect 
the ADA to have different impact for workers who receive workers’ compensation benefits. 
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Figure 1: The Impact of a Change in the Distribution of Firing Costs 
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Figure 2: Percentage Change in Discrimination Claims in California by Basis of Claim, 
1997-2007 
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Figure 3: Percentage Change in Federal Discrimination Claims by Basis of Claim, 1997-
2007 








1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Percent Change 
from 1997




  37Preliminary draft.  Please do not quote or cite. 
 
Figure 4: Change in the Number of Disability Claims in California by Basis for Claim, 
1997-2007 
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Table 1: Comparison of Matched and 
Unmatched CPS Samples 






Age 37.46  38.85  42.76 
Male  49.95 %  49.53 %  46.17 % 
Employed  81.84 %  83.06 %  55.73 % 
High School  23.38 %  22.41 %  26.87 % 
Some College  21.50 %  22.04 %  19.76 % 
College Degree  36.91 %  38.99 %  22.98 % 
White Only  77.58 %  79.80 %  76.30 % 
Black Only  6.90 %  5.93 %  9.94 % 
Other Minority  15.52 %  14.28 %  13.76 % 
Disabled  8.75 %  8.81 %   
Workers Compensation  1.51 %  1.63 %  5.51 % 
Number of Observations  98,959  38,417  3,413 
 




Table 2: Changes in Disability Status from 
First to Second Year 
Matched CPS Sample 
   Second  Year 
 Disability  Status 
Not 
Disabled Disabled 












Disabled 54.08%  45.92% 
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Table 3: Estimated Employment Effects of the Change to 
FEHA by Disability Status and Workers’ Compensation 
Benefit Receipt  
All Workers 
.355*** .356***  .362*** 
Workers Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (.124) (.081)  (.124) 
-.021 -.021  -.022 
Post2002*Disabled  (.027) (.027)  (.026) 
-.081** -.082*  -.08** 
Workers Comp  (.036) (.041)  (.032) 
-.044** -.044**  -.043** 
Disabled  (.018) (.02)  (.016) 
-.156 -.155*  -.160* 
Workers Comp*Disabled  (.096) (.086)  (.089) 
      
Male Only 
.542*** .538***  .555*** 
Workers Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (.155) (.184)  (.168) 
-.037 -.038  -.041 
Post2002*Disabled  (.033) (.033)  (.05) 
-.084* -.088*  -.081** 
Workers Comp  (.046) (.046)  (.036) 
-.017 -.017  -.014 
Disabled  (.02) (.023)  (.024) 
-.22* -.218  -.23* 
Workers Comp*Disabled 
(.126) (.139)  (.13) 
Fixed Effect  None  County  Occupation 
      
Note: Table reports linear probability estimates of the differential 
employment likelihood of disabled workers’ compensation recipients versus 
disabled non-recipients in the post reform (i.e., after 2002) period.  The 
sample is based on the matched CPS in California from 1996-2007, and the 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether the individual was working (at 
least one week worked) in the second year of the match.  The sample is 
restricted to individuals who worked at least one week in the first year of the 
match.  All regressions include demographic characteristics, as well as 
wages in the first year, the replacement rate of lost income in the workers’ 
compensation system, and year fixed-effects.  Robust standard errors are 
included in parentheses.  In the models including fixed-effects for county 
and occupation, the standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering by 
county and occupation, respectively. 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, *** is significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Estimated Effects of the Change to FEHA on the 
Number of Weeks Worked by Disability Status and 
Workers’ Compensation Benefit Receipt 
All workers 
17.732*** 17.683*** 17.553*** 
Workers Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (6.329) (5.701) (5.945) 
-.997 -.953 -1.037 
Post2002*Disabled  (1.475) (1.464) (1.288) 
-3.933** -3.792*** -3.723** 
Workers Comp  (1.897) (1.242) (1.497) 
-3.85*** -3.839*** -3.751*** 
Disabled  (1.02) (.876) (.605) 
-9.467** -9.379** -9.418** 
Workers Comp*Disabled  (4.565) (3.766) (3.978) 
      
Male Only 
28.538*** 27.884** 28.545*** 
Workers Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (8.06) (10.699) (8.028) 
-1.679 -1.589 -1.808 
Post2002*Disabled  (1.92) (1.975) (2.585) 
-3.453 -3.541* -3.086 
Workers Comp  (2.407) (1.753) (2.134) 
-3.122** -3.226** -3.014** 
Disabled  (1.266) (1.419) (1.277) 
-14.372** -13.833** -14.389*** 
Workers Comp*Disabled 
(5.636) (6.177) (4.899) 
Fixed Effect  None  County  Occupation 
      
Note: Table reports OLS estimates of the differential weeks worked of 
disabled workers’ compensation recipients versus disabled non-recipients in 
the post reform (i.e., after 2002) period.  The sample is based on the matched 
CPS in California from 1996-2007, and the dependent variable is the number 
of weeks the individual worked in the second year of the match.  The sample 
is restricted to individuals who worked at least one week in the first year of 
the match.  All regressions include demographic characteristics, as well as 
wages in the first year, the replacement rate of lost income in the workers’ 
compensation system, and year fixed-effects.  Robust standard errors are 
included in parentheses.  In the models including fixed-effects for county and 
occupation, the standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering by county 
and occupation, respectively. 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, *** is significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Estimated Employment Effects of the Change to FEHA by Disability Status 
and Workers’ Compensation Benefit Receipt, by Year in the Post-Reform Period 
  Interaction Year 
Coefficient 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
All workers 
-.368 .288***  .404***  .104  .316***  .414*** 
Workers Comp*Year*Disabled  (.222) (.061) (.061)  (.292)  (.075)  (.065) 
           
Male Only 
-.348  .344***  .439***  .469*** .328*** .387*** 
Workers Comp*Year*Disabled 
(.275) (.103) (.084)  (.114)  (.111)  (.114) 
           
Note: Table reports linear probability estimates of the differential employment likelihood of disabled 
workers’ compensation recipients versus disabled non-recipients in the post reform (i.e., after 2002) period, 
with the estimated effect broken down by year.  The sample is based on the matched CPS in California from 
1996-2007, and the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the individual was working (at least one 
week worked) in the second year of the match.  The sample is restricted to individuals who worked at least 
one week in the first year of the match.  All regressions include demographic characteristics, as well as 
wages in the first year, the replacement rate of lost income in the workers’ compensation system, and year 
fixed-effects.  Robust standard errors are included in parentheses.  In the models including fixed-effects for 
county and occupation, the standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering by county and occupation, 
respectively. 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, *** is significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Test of Employment Trends of Disabled 
Workers and Workers’ Compensation Recipients 
Outside of California in the Post-Reform Period  
Entire U.S.  
(Excluding California) 
All workers 
-.011 -.012  -.012  Coefficient on  Workers 
Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (.059) (.039)  (.044) 
      
Male Only 
-.013 -.013  -.013  Coefficient on  Workers 
Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (.079) (.047)  (.064) 
Western States  
(Excluding California) 
All workers 
-.112 -.106  -.116  Coefficient on  Workers 
Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (.162) (.136)  (.123) 
      
Male Only 
-.155 -.135  -.159  Coefficient on  Workers 
Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (.206) (.18)  (.187) 
Fixed Effect  None  County  Occupation 
      
Note: Table reports linear probability estimates of the differential 
employment likelihood of disabled workers’ compensation recipients 
versus disabled non-recipients in the post reform (i.e., after 2002) period.  
The sample is based on the matched CPS in from 1996-2007, excluding 
California, and the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the 
individual was working (at least one week worked) in the second year of 
the match.  The western states include Washington, Oregon, Arizona, 
Nevada and New Mexico.  The sample is restricted to individuals who 
worked at least one week in the first year of the match.  All regressions 
include demographic characteristics, as well as wages in the first year, 
the replacement rate of lost income in the workers’ compensation 
system, and year fixed-effects.  Robust standard errors are included in 
parentheses.  In the models including fixed-effects for county and 
occupation, the standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering by 
county and occupation, respectively. 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, *** is significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Test of National Employment Trends of Disabled Workers and 
Workers’ Compensation Recipients in the Post-Reform Period, by Year 
(Excluding California) 
  Interaction Year 
Coefficient  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
All workers 
-0.065 -0.061 -0.008 -0.011 -0.016  Workers Comp*Year*Disabled 
(0.056) (0.068) (0.077) (0.090) (0.066) 
       
Male Only 
-0.080 -0.009  0.045 -0.091 -0.054 
Workers Comp*Year*Disabled 
(0.072) (0.081) (0.079) (0.106) (0.082) 
       
Note: Table reports linear probability estimates of the differential employment likelihood of 
disabled workers’ compensation recipients versus disabled non-recipients in the post reform 
period with the effects broken down by year.  The sample is based on the matched CPS in 
from 1996-2007, excluding California, and the dependent variable is an indicator for whether 
the individual was working (at least one week worked) in the second year of the match.  The 
sample is restricted to individuals who worked at least one week in the first year of the match.  
All regressions include demographic characteristics, as well as wages in the first year, the 
replacement rate of lost income in the workers’ compensation system, and year fixed-effects.  
Robust standard errors are included in parentheses.  In the models including fixed-effects for 
county and occupation, the standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering by county and 
occupation, respectively. 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, *** is significant at 1% 
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Appendix 
 
Estimation Results for the Full Set of Covariates 
  In Table A1 we provide the estimation results for the full set of covariates in our 
preferred specification. This is the model with the full sample of California workers (male and 
female), where employment is used as the dependent variable and no occupation or county 
fixed-effects are included.  This corresponds to the results presented in the top row and first 
column of Table 3. 
  The dependent variable is employment in the second period, so we expect that those 
factors that are generally predictive of better employment outcomes (e.g., higher levels of 
education) should have positive coefficients.  We find that this is generally the case.  Workers 
with a high school or college degree are significantly more likely to keep working, as are 
workers with higher wage rate.  Our quadratic specification indicates that age has a positive 
but concave impact on the likelihood of working.  Nonwhites are less likely to work in the 
second year.  The temporary disability replacement rate in workers’ compensation is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of working, though the impact is small and not 
statistically significant.  The year fixed-effects display no clear trend in employment, though 
there appears to be some general decline in the likelihood of working relative to base year 
(1996). 
  While we present the results for only our preferred specification, the same overall 
pattern arises in other specifications as well.  Those factors that predict employment in more 
general models also predict the likelihood of employment in the second year in our model.   
 
Alternate Specification of Disability 
  In our main empirical work we use fair or poor self-reported health to indicate 
disability.  We adopt this measure because (1) the definition of disability in FEHA is broad, 
and the self-reported health measure is more inclusive, and (2) we feel that there exists a 
greater potential for bias in the question that asks about work limitations.  In Table A2 we 
present estimates of the model using a self-reported work limitation as our indicator of 
disability.  The table presents results for the full sample (men and women) with our preferred 
model, using employment as the dependent variable (analogous to the model in the top panel 
of Table 3).   
In general, the results are consistent with our central findings, in terms of the signs of 
the estimated coefficients.  The primary coefficient of interest, the interaction between 
disability and workers’ compensation receipt in the post-reform period, is positive, though it 
is not statistically significant.  The impact of this measure of disability on the likelihood of 
working, both on its own and interacted with workers’ compensation receipt, is noticeably 
stronger than in the preferred model.  This could be because this measure of disability 
indicates worse overall health, but it is also consistent with a bias of unemployed workers 
being more likely to report a disability.  Overall, we feel that self-reported health provides the 
most reliable measure of disability for this analysis.  However, we do note that the statistical 
significance of our primary coefficient of interest is sensitive to the choice of specification.
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Table A1: The Full Set of Estimated Coefficients for the Employment Model 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  t-Stat P(t) 
Disabled and Workers Comp in the post-period  0.355  0.124  2.870  0.004 
Workers Compensation  -0.081  0.036  -2.250  0.025 
Workers Comp in 2001  0.134  0.039  3.440  0.001 
Workers Comp after 2002  -0.016  0.058  -0.270  0.785 
Disabled -0.044  0.018  -2.460  0.014 
Disabled in 2001  0.058  0.037  1.590  0.113 
Disabled in the post-period  -0.021  0.027  -0.800  0.426 
Disabled and Workers Comp  -0.156  0.096  -1.630  0.103 
Disabled and Workers Comp in 2001  -0.340  0.221  -1.540  0.124 
Disabled in the post-period  -0.093  0.013  -7.170  0.000 
Female -0.042  0.004  -10.200  0.000 
Age 0.014  0.002  6.580  0.000 
Aged Squared  -0.000  0.000  -6.000  0.000 
Hispanic -0.024  0.010  -2.430  0.015 
African American  -0.011  0.006  -1.860  0.063 
High School  0.042  0.008  5.330  0.000 
Some College  0.042  0.008  5.300  0.000 
College Degree  0.054  0.007  7.480  0.000 
Temporary Disability Rate*1000  -0.372  0.409  -0.910  0.364 
Wage Rate  0.000  0.000  -0.750  0.453 
1997 -0.008  0.008  -0.940  0.348 
1998 -0.005  0.008  -0.610  0.544 
1999 -0.019  0.009  -2.170  0.030 
2000 0.002  0.008  0.310  0.757 
2001 -0.007  0.008  -0.780  0.435 
2002 -0.017  0.009  -1.830  0.067 
2003 -0.006  0.008  -0.720  0.469 
2004 -0.022  0.010  -2.290  0.022 
2005 -0.003  0.008  -0.360  0.719 
2006 -0.021  0.009  -2.390  0.017 
Constant 0.672  0.040  16.650  0.000 
Note: Table reports linear probability estimates of the differential employment likelihood of disabled 
workers’ compensation recipients versus disabled non-recipients in the post reform (i.e., after 2002) period.  
The sample is based on the matched CPS in California from 1996-2007, and the dependent variable is an 
indicator for whether the individual was working (at least one week worked) in the second year of the match.  
The sample is restricted to individuals who worked at least one week in the first year of the match.  Robust 
standard errors are included in parentheses.   
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Table A2: Model Estimates Using Self-Reported Work 
Limitations as the Disability Measure 
All workers 
.153 .153 .157 
Workers Comp*Post2002*Disabled  (.138) (.12) (.132) 
-.047 -.047 -.047 
Post2002*Disabled  (.051) (.049) (.041) 
-.000 -.000 -.000 
Workers Comp  (.026) (.023) (.024) 
-.113*** -.115*** -.112*** 
Disabled  (.033) (.027) (.017) 
-.308*** -.308*** -.310*** 
Workers Comp*Disabled  (.093) (.066) (.061) 
Fixed Effect  None  County  Occupation 
      
Note: Table reports linear probability estimates of the differential 
employment likelihood of disabled workers’ compensation recipients versus 
disabled non-recipients in the post reform (i.e., after 2002) period.  The 
sample is based on the matched CPS in California from 1996-2007, and the 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether the individual was working (at 
least one week worked) in the second year of the match.  The sample is 
restricted to individuals who worked at least one week in the first year of the 
match.  All regressions include demographic characteristics, as well as wages 
in the first year, the replacement rate of lost income in the workers’ 
compensation system, and year fixed-effects.  Robust standard errors are 
included in parentheses.  In the models including fixed-effects for county and 
occupation, the standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering by county 
and occupation, respectively. 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, *** is significant at 1% 
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